The Tax Court ruled that IRS Appeals Officers and Team Managers were not “Officers of the United States.” Therefore, they did not need to be appointed under the Appointments Clause.

The taxpayer filed income taxes for tax years 2012 (TY) through TY 2017, but he did not pay tax. During a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing, the taxpayer raised constitutional arguments that IRS Appeals and associated employees serve in violation of the Appointments Clause and the constitutional separation of powers.

No Significant Authority

The court noted that IRS Appeals officers do not wield significant authority. For instance, the officers do not have authority to examine witnesses, unlike Tax Court Special Trial Judges (STJs) and SEC Administrative Law Judges (ALJs). The Appeals officers also lack the power to issue, serve, and enforce summonses through the IRS’s general power to examine books and witnesses.

The court found no reason to deviate from earlier judgments in Tucker v. Commissioner (Tucker I), 135 T.C. 114, Dec. 58,279); and Tucker v. Commissioner (Tucker II), CA-DC, 676 F.3d 1129, 2012-1 ustc ¶50,312). Both judgments emphasized the court’s observations in the current case. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (per curiam), the Supreme Court similarly held that Federal Election Commission (FEC) commissioners were not appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause, and thus none of them were permitted to exercise “significant authority.”

The taxpayer lacked standing to challenge the appointment of the IRS Appeals Chief, and said officers under the Appointments Clause, and the removal of the Chief under the separation of powers doctrine.

IRC Chief of Appeals

The taxpayer failed to prove that the Chief’s tenure affected his hearing and prejudiced him in some way, under standards in United States v. Smith, 962 F.3d 755 (4th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Castillo, 772 F. App’x 11 (3d Cir. 2019). The Chief did not participate in the taxpayer’s CDP hearing, and so the Chief did not injure the taxpayer. The taxpayer’s injury was not fairly traceable to the appointment (or lack thereof) of the Chief, and the Chief was too distant from the case for any court order pointed to him to redress the taxpayer’s harm.

C.C. Tooke III, 164 TC No. 2, Dec. 62,610